Khalil Matar

When demonstrators took to the streets of Yemen to contribute to what they thought would be their version of the “Arab Spring,” little did they know it would mark the beginning of another mini-civil war in a country that has already experienced its fair share. They did not envision a youth movement turning into a new alliance of tribes and traditional oppositionists. They thought, for once, they would be able to outfox President Ali Abdallah Saleh, one of the shrewdest political leaders of his age. Instead, they practically played into his hand.

It did not take long after Tunisia and Egypt erupted in chaos before the Yemeni youth felt they should also be part of the “revolutions” developing in the region. They gathered around the Egyptian embassy in Sanaa awaiting the fall of Mubarak, wanting to celebrate along with their Egyptian brothers. They took to the main square in their capital and conducted university-wide sit-ins. Yet, most of the political elite were skeptical of their influence assuming, just like Egyptian officials did of their young revolutionaries, that they were simply inexperienced idealists who could never catalyze meaningful change.

After Mubarak fell, and the Libyan revolt gathered momentum both militarily and with support from NATO, the whole political society in Yemen began to fear this crisis was going to be prolonged. The traditional oppositionists felt this was an opportunity they should not miss. They thought strong allies of the United States were not being protected internationally. Ben Ali was forced to leave Tunisia, Mubarak had to give up power, and Qaddafi, whose rule was being transformed by the West, is currently losing ground. Why not use this momentum to unseat the one ruler that was able to suppress a historically vibrant Yemeni society?

Then came the new players in this “Spring;” Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Saudi Arabia had a historical role in Yemen bribing rulers and tribes to buy off any possible outflow of disturbance to its southwestern borders. Qatar had Al Jazeera. By then, both had fully supported the revolt in Libya and Syria, and while they had their differences they found their post-Mubarak paths in Egypt crossing. They both tried to use the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as a mediator.

Not long after the secretary general of GCC met the Yemeni president and some oppositionists, Saleh outmaneuvered both by opposing Qatar’s role. After pressure from Saudi Arabia, Qatar withdrew from this effort, leaving it to the Saudis who considered Yemen a national security issue. This conflict between the one-time enemies played into the hands of the Yemeni supreme fox.

Then Saleh turned his attention inward. He realized that the youth movement could force him to face the same fate as his Egyptian and Tunisian counterparts. He indirectly encouraged the traditional oppositionists to join forces with the youth. They did not realize he was turning the whole movement into a worn out tribal conflict that provided him with a situation he could skillfully manipulate… Even his old nemesis General Ali Mohsen, who should have known him best, played into his hands and defected with his division.

General Mohsen and his division miscalculated. He had long believed that Saleh was going to sidestep him and give power to his son Ahmad. Some other factors led the general to believe he would appear to be the best available alternative:

• He thought the fact that the biggest tribe allied with Saleh, Hashed, was fed up with him would lead it to ally with Mohsen, a descendant of the same tribe and family of Saleh. This would keep the current tribal equation alive leading to stability after the fall of this regime.
• He believed his marriage into one of the biggest tribes in the South would lead them to be allies in the fight against Saleh.
• When he was leading the government’s war against the Houthis in Saada, he allied himself with Salafists and Qaeda sympathizers who would fight ferociously against the “Shiite Houthis” He thought they would support him in this quest.

Yet, Mohsen failed to fully realize that Hashed had other considerations:

• Hashed is the biggest tribe with power and have many other smaller tribes as allies.
• Sadek who is the leader and his brother Hameed who is the businessman of the family and who has political ambitions, think they deserve the presidency and that they should not rule by proxy.
• The Salafists and other Islamists like Islamic tribal leader Sheikh Abdel Majeed Al Zendani, know him as a figure of the old regime.

Other oppositionists have their own considerations as well:

• The country’s economic situation has been sliding downhill for over a decade leaving many disgruntled about any figure or alliance tried during Saleh’s long rule.
• People in the South have been relegated to second-class citizens since the unification of the country in 1991.
• Many of the smaller tribes feel they never had a good share of the state. Their time may be now, but it could also not be for years.
• Most importantly, the intellectual and traditional political figures would find themselves in the shoes of the old Socialists of the defunct Southern Yemen, refusing to be ruled by conservative minded tribes or military officers.

The concerns of the youth have been all but lost in this complicated picture. Even when one of them is killed in the demonstrations his tribe takes over asking for revenge, not his colleagues. . The idealism of the youth movement is forced to take a backseat in favor of the older alliances of their tribe.

Even the United States has been outfoxed by Saleh. Whether or not he participated in the assassination of the terrorist Anwar Al Awlaki and his colleagues, he and his regime must have cooperated in some way. The White House scrambled to praise his cooperation in the morning and called on him to leave by night. None other than Saleh stands to benefit, especially when Islamists are taking over towns and are very visible in the demonstrations calling for his removal from power.

Who will benefit the most, then? None other than the Fox himself.

October 01 2011